INTRODUCTION
Traditional centralized approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed, multi-agent systems (MAS). Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can provide a softer notion of security that is sufficient for many MAS applications. The most reliable reputation information can be derived from an agent's own experience. However, much more data becomes available when reputation information is shared among an agent community. Such mechanisms have been proposed and also practically implemented. The various rating services on the Internet as well as research results presented in [5, 6] are examples of such mechanisms.
It is however not at all clear that it is in the best interest of an agent to truthfully report reputation information because (1) reporting any reputation information provides a competitive advantage to others, and (2) by reporting positive ratings, the agent slightly decreases its own reputation with respect to the average of other agents, so it may be a disadvantage to report them truthfully.
For centralized auctioning systems, the problem of eliciting honest reporting is addressed in [2] and [4] . In this paper we present a decentralized reputation mechanism that is incentive-compatible and secure enough to be used in real world applications.
THE MODEL
The scenario is the following. We assume we have N rational agents: ai for i = 1 . . . N, with N a large number, interacting pairwise in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) environment [1] . The players are selected randomly, pregame contracts are allowed but they are not binding (there is no If an agent enters the game, it will cooperate (C) or defect (D). The behavior of an agent is influenced by an a priori type (defined by a fixed probability of cooperation) and a time variant component which depends on the last k actions of the agent. The a priori type can be interpreted as innate (genetic) information about the agent behavior, while the time variant component is the present "mood" of an agent with "memory" of length k.
Definition 1. An agent A behaves according to a dynamic type with memory k, if the probability of agent A cooperating at time t depends on a fixed a priori probability of cooperation p and the sequence (at−1at−2 . . . a t−k ) of the last k actions took by the agent:
where
At the end of each game agents can report either 0 for a defection (D) or 1 for cooperation (C). Reputation information is constituted by the set of the last M reports submitted about an agent, where M is some integer. Even if the action of reporting reputation information does not cost anything, an agent will be indifferent between reporting true or false information. Therefore, incentive compatible reporting has to be based on side-payments that make it rational for agents to truthfully share reputation information. In our mechanism, these side-payments are organized through a set of broker agents, called R-agents, that buy and sell reputation information. The information stored by R-agents is not synchronized, R-agents are independent entities which can have different views on the environment, therefore our reputation mechanism does not depend on one central authority.
Before deciding whether or not to play the game, agents can buy reputation information about another agent from the R-agent of their choice at a cost F, and later sell reputation information to the same R-agent at a price F . R-agents scale F and F such that the mechanism breaks even in the long run.
INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE REPUTATION REPORTING
Let us look in more detail at payment functions that can elicit honest reputation information reporting from agents. As there is no central authority to provide irrefutable information, the payment function can be based only on the reports of other agents. Since we cannot assume that past information can be kept secret from the reporting agent, the payment function can only depend on future, unknown reports.
Let π : {0, 1} × Ψ → R be such a function. Ψ is the set of all possible sets containing L reputation reports (0 or 1). π(s, S) is the payment an agent A obtains when submitting a report s ∈ {0, 1} about B and the set S of reputation reports has been subsequently observed about the same agent B. π elicits truthful reporting if it is maximized when the agent tells the truth: at time t, the expected value
if a C is observed at t and S
C is the set of future reports filed by other agents conditional on the fact that C occurred at t, and similarly
if a D is observed at t and S
D is the set of future reports filed by other agents conditional on the fact that D occurred at t.
Theorem 1. For agents of dynamic type (Definition 1) if the function Γ (Equation (1)) does not depend on the agent's previous actions, there is no payment function that can be used by a reputation system in order to elicit honest reputation reporting.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is the following: If the behavior of the agent is independently identically distributed with some probability p (Γ does not depend on the agent's previous actions), the reputation information will at some point accurately predict p. Knowing p, an agent can predict the future reports on which the payment function is based and therefore can report the value that maximizes the payment function (which is independent on the present observation) instead of the true observation.
For environments in which the assumptions of Theorem 1 do not hold, we propose a payment scheme that makes it rational for agents to truthfully share the reputation information they have acquired in their past experience. The basic idea is that R-agents pay for a reputation report only if it matches the next report submitted about the same agent. The payment function which models this rule is:
In [3] we show that this payment function elicits honest reporting from the very first interactions within the system. However, supplementary constraints need to be imposed on the parameters of the agents behavior model in order for π (Equation (2)) to supply stable truth-telling incentives in the long run. Γ(p, D, at−1, . . . , a t−k+1 ) ) > 0.5, for all at−1, . . . , a t−k+1 ∈ {0, 1} the payment function defined in Equation (2) induces truthful reporting.
There are payment schemes that require softer constraints [4] , however, our mechanism is simpler, easier to use in the starting period of the system, and can accommodate dynamic environments.
SECURITY GUARANTEES
In order to make the reputation mechanism itself trustworthy enough to be used by a real world application, a cryptographic mechanism is used to protect the integrity of reputation information and to achieve a tight bonding between the identity and reputation of an agent.
In [3] we propose a cryptographic mechanism based on asymmetric encryption that ensures the following properties: (1) the reputation of an agent is uniquely tied to its identity; (i.e. no agent A can "steal" the reputation of agent B); (2) no agent can by its own will falsely increase or decrease its reputation; and (3) no agent can tamper with agent A's reputation without A's consent.
Each agent has only one pair of keys (sk, pk), sk being secret and pk being public. The reputation information rA about agent A, kept by an R-agent, is the set of the last M reports submitted about agent A to that R-agent: rA = {(reporti, ti)|i = 1, . . . , M} where ti is a time-stamp that uniquely identifies each report. However, R-agents actually store E(rA, skA), rA encrypted with the secret key of agent A.
By (rA + +) we denote the set of reports about agent A updated with one more positive report. Similarly, (rA − −) is the set of reports about agent A updated with one more negative report. As part of the pregame contract agents ask from their partners signed versions of (r + +) and (r − −). At the end of the game, agents are free to file the positive or the negative report, by sending one of E((r + +), sk) or E((r − −), sk) to the R-agent. R-agents only accept valid reports, i.e. having a valid signature and valid time-stamps.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In our work, we built a reputation mechanism for an environment in which a big number of agents play an IPD game. The mechanism was implemented for an open MAS environment and provides security guarantees that make it usable in a real life application. Both direct interaction-derived reputation and propagated indirect reputation were used, and special care was dedicated to the problem of incentive compatibility. Future work includes the problem of collusion resistance and adapting the mechanism for environments in which payoffs differ from one interaction to another.
